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JURISDICTION
Defendant Utah State Department of Transportation hereby
agrees

with

and

incorporates

by

reference

the

statement

of

Jurisdiction found in the Brief of Nicholas Lamarr, Appellant.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Defendant

Utah

State

Department

of

Transportation,

pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
hereby submits that the following issues are before this Court that
were not presented in the Appellant's Brief.
1. Did the failure of the Plaintiff, Nicholas Lamarr, to
comply with the requirements of §63-30-12 Utah Code Ann. 1953, by
not having filed a timely notice of claim with the Office of the
Attorney General require the dismissal of this action as to the
Utah State Department of Transportation?
2.

Did the Utah State Department of Transportation owe

a duty to Nicholas Lamarr under the facts of the instant case?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY
§63-30-10(1) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of employment except if the
injury arises out of:
(1) the exercise

or performance

or the

failure to

exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the
discretion is abus€»d;
§63-30-12 Utah Code Ann. 1953
A claim against the state, or against its employees for
an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general
and the agency concerned within one year after the claim arises, or
before the expiration of any extension of time granted under
Section 6 3-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving
rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant

Utah

State

Department

of

Transportation

incorporates by reference the arguments concerning duty, proximate
cause, and transients not being a defective condition of the
roadway found in the Appellee Brief of Salt Lake City.
1.

Plaintiff served his notice of claim only upon the

Department of Transportation.

§63-30-12 Utah Code Ann. 1953,

clearly requires that a notice of claim be served on both the
2

agency and the Attorney General's Office-

Because the plaintiff

failed to fulfill the condition precedent for filing an action
against a state agency, this action should be dismissed as against
the department for lack of jurisdiction.

Because the plaintiff's

failing is a jurisdictional one, it could not be waived and could
have been raised at any time by either party or by the court sua
sponte.
2.

Any conduct of the Department concerning signing on

the North Temple Overpass was not a proximate
plaintiff's injuries.

cause of the

Plaintiff was not misled, but was fully

aware of the existence of the pedestrian walkway.

That the

plaintiff would be intimidated by unknown third persons from using
tne pedestrian walkway; that he would chose to use the vehicle
travel portion of the overpass rather than detour to the next
available pedestrian walkway; that an acquaintance of the plaintiff
would make an unsafe lane change in an effort to give the plaintiff
a ride and that this would cause another car to be forced into
striking the plaintiff cannot be said to have been reasonably
forseeable to the Utah State Department of Transportation.
3.

To show negligence on the part of the Utah State

Department of Transportation, it is first necessary to show that
the Department had a duty of reasonable care extending to the
plaintiff.

No such duty exists given the circumstances of the

instant action.

The Department had no duty to control third

persons who might congregate on or near the pedestrian walkway in
question. The Department also urges this Court to rule that it had
3

no duty towards a pedestrian who, with knowledge of the walkway,
affirmatively choosers to instead use the vehicular lanes of travel.
ARGUMENT
Defendant
incorporates
Appellee's

Utah

herein

Brief

of

State

by reference

Department

of

the arguments

Transportation
found

in the

Salt Lake City as far as the same are

applicable to this Defendant, and adds the following argument.
I. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF
CLAIM WITH THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WAS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT REQUIRING THAT THE
INSTANT ACTION BE DISMISSED AS IT PERTAINS TO
THE UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
While this issue was raised but not decided in the trial
court, this Court

M

... may affirm trial court decisions on any

proper ground(s), despite the trial court's having assigned another
reason for its ruling (footnote omitted)".

Buehner Block Co. v.

UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
The claims of Plaintiff against the Utah State Department
of Transportation are subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
which provides at Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12:
A claim against the state, or against
its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the Attorney General and the agency
concerned within one year after the
claim arises. . . . (Emphasis added.)
The statutory language above is clear and unambiguous.
Where, as here, suit is brought against an agency of the State of
Utah, a condition precedent to bringing suit is the* filing of a
timely notice of claim with the State agency and the Office of the
4

Attorney General.

If this is not done, suit is barred.

In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), this
Court addressed the question of what the effect was of not filing
the appropriate Notice of Claim.

This Court held that the

dismissal of an action for failure to file a timely notice of claim
was a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Because the plaintiffs in Madsen I did
not give the required notice and therefore
failed to satisfy a precondition to suit, the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the merits of their claim.
Id., 769 P. 2d at 250. Such a jurisdictional issue cannot
be waived.

In Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960,

964 (Utah 1986) held that "... a lack of jurisdiction can be raised
at any time by either party or by the court."
In Sears v. Southworth v. State, 563 P.2d 192 (1977),
the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with
the notice of claim requirement of the Governmental Immunity Act.
In Sears, the plaintiff argued that although no formal notice of
claim was filed as required by Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-12, the State
did receive adequate notice of the accident and was aware, or
should have been aware, of the negligence involved.

The Sears

court cited Varoz v. Sevev, 506 P.2d 435 (1973), with approval.
Actual knowledge of the circumstances
. . . does not dispense with the necessity of
filing a timely claim.
Plaintiff may not be excepted from the requirement
that he file the appropriate notice of claim.

In Scarborough v.

Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975), this Court
5

addressed the companion statute that mandates the filing of a
timely notice of claim when suing a political subdivision of the
State of Utah. §63-30-13 Utah Code Ann. is virtually identical to
S63-30-12.
In dismissing an action against a School District where
the notice of claim was not filed in a timely manner, this Court
explained:
The School District is a political
subdivision of the state. Therefore it would
normally be immune from suit; and the right to
sue is an exception created by statute. We
have consistently held that where a cause of
action is based upon a statute, full
compliance with
its requirements
is a
condition precedent to the right to maintain
a suit.
Id. at 4B2. The same logic applies even more
emphatically

to an action against the State of Utah itself.

Moreover, even were Plaintiff to argue that this Defendant received
adequate notice of the accident and was aware, or should have been
aware of its alleged negligence, there would still be no legal
excuse for failure to file a notice of claim because "actual
knowledge of the circumstances . . . does not dispense with the
necessity of filing a timely claim." Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435
(Utah 1973).
A notice? of claim was filed with the Utah State
Department of Transportation, but no such notice of claim was filed
with the Attorney General. A notice of claim in this action should
have been filed with the Attorney General as well no later than
April 18, 1988.

The only document upon which Plaintiff could
6

attempt to rely, in claiming to have complied with this statute,
was the single filing with the Department of Transportation.

In

the instant case, full compliance with § 63-30-12 requires filing
a notice of claim with the Attorney General

and with the Utah

State Department of Transportation.
United States District Court Judge J. Thomas Greene
addressed this issue in Kabwasa v. University of Utah, 89-C-488G,
United States District Court for the District of Utah.
involved,

among

other

University of Utah.

issues, state

law

claims

Kabwasa

against

the

In dismissing those claims, Judge Greene held

that the filing of a notice of claim with the Attorney General's
Office, but not with the 'agency concerned', did not comply with
§63-30-12 and was grounds for dismissing the claims.
D.)

(See Exhibit

In so ruling, Judge Greene explained:
ruling, Judge Greene explained:
The court agrees with the defendants
that the plain meaning of section 63-30-12
requires that two notices of claim should have
been filed by plaintiff: one to the Attorney
General and one to the University of Utah.
Although this statutory requirement may result
in redundant
notice being given, such
redundancy apparently is mandated by the
statute inasmuch as the Utah Attorney General
is the agent and legal counsel for all state
agencies, including the University of Utah.
In this pendant state law claim, the court is
unwilling to ignore the unambiguous language
of the Utah statute requiring two separate
notices, especially where the Utah Supreme
Court has repeatedly held
that strict
compliance with the notice of claim provision
is essential to maintain a suit pursuant to
the Governmental Immunity Act.
Memorandum Decision and Order at page 5.

Plaintiff,

having failed to comply with §63-30-12, his claims are now barred
7

and his complaint against Defendant Utah State Department of
Transportation herein should be dismissed as a matter of law.
II. NO ACTION OF THE UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P. 2d 240, 245
(Utah 1985, this Court set out the definition of proximate cause.
The standard definition of proximate
cause is "that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause), produces the injury and
without which the result would not have
occurred. It is the efficient cause - the one
that necessarily sets in operation the factors
tnat accomplish the injury."
(footnote
omitted)
In Butterfield v. Okubo, 790 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals explained that:
The element of proximate causation in a
tort case inquires into whether the defendant
could, under the circumstances, reasonably
foresee that the harm of which the plaintiff
complains would result from the defendant's
breach of the standard of care.
(Citations
omitted.) Without proof of proximate cause,
the plaintiff
cannot recover
in tort,
(Citations omitted.)
To

determine

if

the

Utah

State

Department

of

Transportation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged
injuries, it is mjcessary to look at the sequence of events that
led to the accident in question.
1.

Th€> Utah State Department of Transportation, in

designing the North Temple Overpass, created a pedestrian walkway
separate from the vehicular travel portions of the structure.

No

signs were placed expressly forbidding pedestrians from using the

8

vehicle lanes and requiring that pedestrians use the pedestrian
walkway that is provided.
2.

Nicholas Lamarr, knowing of the existence of the

pedestrian walkway, uses the pedestrian walkway to cross from east
to west on the North Temple Overpass.
3.

Lamarr

is

frightened

by

contact

with

unknown

individuals at the western end of the pedestrian walkway.
4.

Lamarr decides to avoid the persons he believes are

still at the western end of the pedestrian walkway by returning
eastward by another route.
5.

Lamarr, rather than use the walkway or walk several

blocks to the next pedestrian path, decides return to the eastern
end of the North Temple Overpass by walking against traffic in the
northernmost westbound vehicular lane of traffic. (There are three
westbound lanes of traffic).
6.

Don Ainsworth, an acquaintance of Mr. Lamarr's, was

driving in the center westbound lane of the North Temple Overpass
looking for Nicholas Lamarr. Upon seeing Lamarr, Ainsworth swerved
his vehicle into the northernmost

lane of travel to pick up

Nicholas Lamarr.
7.

The Ainsworth vehicle struck a car being driven by

Stanley Cross. Cross' car was thereby forced into Lamarr, causing
the complained of injuries.
The Utah State Department of Transportation urges this
Court to hold that its conduct in designing the North Temple
Overpass is not a proximate cause of the accident in question.
9

It is hard to believe that, in designing the Overpass,
any individual could have foreseen the strange course of events
that unfortunately led to the instant accident.

That an unhappy

encounter with some people on the walkway would lead an individual
to use the vehicle lanes of the overpass where he would be struck
by a car forced into him by a friend who was making an unsafe lane
change could not be reasonably foreseen.
It is also a question of inappropriate speculation, at
best, to hypothesize on whether or not the presence of some
specially

created

no pedestrian

sign would

have altered

the

decision of plaintiff.
For these reasons, and those set forth in the Brief of
Salt Lake City, which has been adopted herein by reference, the
Utah State Department of Transportation urges this Court to affirm
the trial court's finding that this defendant was not a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
III. UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF LAMARR GIVEN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INSTANT ACTION
In order to show that the Utah State Department of
Transportation was negligent in this action, the plaintiff must
show:
(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the
defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that
duty; (3) the causation, both actually and
proximately, of injury; and (4) the suffering
of damages by the plaintiff.
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).

The

Department expressly adopts and incorporates by reference the

10

argument of Salt Lake City in its brief on the subject of duty.
Plaintiff has misunderstood the issue of the duty of
reasonable care that a plaintiff must show he was owed by a
defendant

to prove negligence.

All of plaintiff's

argument

claiming that the Governmental Immunity Act has expressly waived
immunity for this action is misplaced.
Plaintiff has confused the question of sovereign immunity
with the basic tort principle that negligence can only be shown by
establishing a duty running from the defendant to the plaintiff
that the defendant has breached.
This is not an action seeking to show a duty owed by the
Department to the public using the pedestrian walkway to design,
construct and maintain the walkway so that it is safe for the
expected use of the public.

Nor is this action concerning a duty

by the Department to design, construct and maintain the vehicle
travel portion of the North Temple Overpass so that it is afe for
the expected use of the motoring public.
Instead the plaintiff appears to ask this Court to create
one of two new duties.

First, the plaintiff seeks to have this

Court declare that the Department has a duty to control the actions
of unknown third persons who may intimidate members of the public
who are using state roads and walkways.

Plaintiff does not show

that the Department has any special relationship with these unknown
third persons or with plaintiff.

Given this Court's decision in

Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989), no such duty
exists.
11

Second, plaintiff asks this Court to hold that the
Department had a duty to prevent a pedestrian, who is aware of the
pedestrian walkway, from using the vehicle travel portions of the
Overpass.

The Utah State Department of Transportation urges this

Court to find no special duty owed by the Department to an
individual who intcmtionally misuses a state road. To do otherwise
would be to make the State an insurer of the public.
The duty, if any, of the State of Utah to Nicholas Lamarr
was to design, construct and maintain the pedestrian walkway free
of dangerous or defective conditions.

The presence of unknown

third persons near the western terminus of the walkway is not a
dangerous or defective condition for which the State owes any duty
to plaintiff.

State of Utah hereby incorporates by reference the

argument of Salt Lake City that 'transients' are not a "defective
condition" of the roadway.
CONCLUSION
Because Nicholas Lamarr never filed a notice of claim
with the Attorney General's Office as required by statute, the
courts never had jurisdiction over the merits of his claims against
the Utah State Department of Transportation.
Even if such a notice of claim had been properly filed,
plaintiff has failed to show that any conduct of the Department was
a proximate cause of his injuries.
Finally, the Department owed no duty of reasonable care
to the plaintiff in the unique situation that Lamarr placed himself
into.
12

For

these

reasons,

the

Utah

State

Department

of

Transportation respectfully asks this Court to affirm the dismissal
with prejudice of this action as it relates to the Department.
Respectfully submitted this

/*?

day of May, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant Utah
State Dept. of Transportation
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/*7 ^
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Gordon K. Jensen
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DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION
ETIE JANVIER KABWASA#
1 >]ainti f f f

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, TOM BURT,
GREG COVER, MARK FLUTSY, DAVID
HOLBROOK, STEFHEN B. MOULDING,
STACIE RADLEY, GAYLE O. SNYDER,
LYLE STEVENS, JERRY THOMPSON,
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10,

Civil No. 89-C-4BBG

Defendants.
This xnatter came on regularly on March 15, 1990 for
hearing on Defendants' Motions for Partial Dismissal and for
Partial Surjnary Judgment.

Defendants were represented by

Assistant Utah Attorney General William Evans and Assistant Utah
Attorney General Reed M. Stringham, and plaintiff was represented
by L. 2ane Gill.

After briefing by the parties and oral

argument, the court took defendants' motions under advisement.
Now, being fully advised, the court sets forth its Memorandum
Decision and Order.

BACKGROUND
This case involves claims of racial discrimination in
connection with plaintiff's employment at the University of Utah,
which was terminated on December 4, 1987.

Plaintiff's suit names

the University and various University employees as defendants.
In addition to alleging various common law pendant tort claims
(Counts IV through X), plaintiff alleges violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) £fc. seq.,
(Count I), and violation of his civil rights redressable under 42
U.S.C. S§ 1981, 1983 (Counts II and III).
All defendants moved for summary judgment on the
pendant state lav claims (Counts IV through X), on the basis that
plaintiff failed to file the requisite notice of claim pursuant
to sections 63-30-11 and -12 of the Utah Code.

In addition,

defendant University of Utah moved to dismiss all claims, except
the Title VII claim (Count I), on the basis that such claims are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that the State of Utah has
not waived immunity as to the University under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 63-30-1 to -38
(1969).

Plaintiff conceded in his second reply brief that all

claims against the University except Count I should be dismissed.
Accordingly, those claims are dismissed.

Also, defendant David

Holbrook moved for dismissal of all counts against him, and
plaintiff conceded in his second reply brief that defendant
Holbrook should be dismissed entirely from plaintiff's suit.
Accordingly, all claims against defendant Holbrook are dismissed.
Defendant Stacie Radley moved for summary judgment as to Count
VII, the breach of fiduciary duty claim, but that ©otion was
withdrawn at the time of argument.
2

The only issue that remains Is whether plaintiff's
pendant state law c l a m s against thr i<&aining individual
defendants ought to be dismissed for failure by plaintiff to
comply vith the notice of claim provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, l»fn1 rodr * HI

|| C 3-30-1], -12.

DISCUSSION
For purposes of their motion on the notice of claim
issue, the individual defendants agree that plaint ill's causes of
action arose on December 4
was terminated.

19B7, the day plaintiff's employment

On September 15, 1988, plaintiff's attorney L.

Zane Gill delivered a letter addressed to William Evans, an
Assistant Attorney General of the State of Utah,

This letter

outlined the acts of discrimination allegedly suffered by
plaintiff and discussed settlement if the matter.

At issue is

whether this letter satisfied the "notice of claim*1 requirement
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
1.

Fecpjirenent of Two Notices

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the
procedure for suing the State of Utah and its agencies and
erployees.

Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-12 of the Act sets forth

the notice of claim requirement at issue in this case.
63-3 0-12 provides:
A claim against the state, or against
its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim
3

Section

Is filed with the attorney general and the
agency concerned within one year after the
claim arises . . . regardless of whether or
not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1989).
Defendants argue that plaintiff's letter of September
15, 1988 to en Assistant Attorney General is insufficient because
the statute explicitly requires the that two notices be sent; one
to the attorney general and one to the "agency concerned,91 which
in this case is the University of Utah.

As support, defendants

cite several Utah Supreme Court cases which emphasize that full
compliance with the notice of claim requirement is necessary to
maintain an action pursuant to the statute, even if a defendant
has actual notice of the claim.

Payne v. Kvers, 743 P.2d 186,

190 (Utah 1987); Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d
480, 482 (Utah 1975); Varoz v. Sevev, 506 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah
1973) .
Plaintiff responds to defendants1 argument by claiming
that the requirement of filing two notices is redundant and
unnecessary.

Plaintiff asserts that notice was filed with

Assistant Attorney General William Evans whom plaintiff's counsel
Knew to be counsel for the University.

Plaintiff argues that Kr.

Evans was a duel agent for both the Attorney General and the
University of Utah, and that the single notice filed with Kr.
Evans was tantamount to filing separate notices with the Attorney
General and the University.
4

The court agrees vith the defendants that the plain
meaning of section 63-30-12 requires that two notices of claim
should have been filed b> plaintiff: one to the Attorney General
and one to the University of Utah.

Although thii statutory

requirement »ay result in redundant notice being given, such
redundancy apparently is cii'dated by the statute inasmuch as the
Utah Attorney General is the agent and legal counsel for all
st at i agencies, including the University of Utah.

In this

pendant state lav claim, the court is unwilling to ignore
unambiguous language of the Utah statute requiring two separate
notices, especially where the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that strict compliance with the notice of claim provision is
essential to maintain a suit pursuant to the Governmental
Immunity Act.
2.

Notice Pequirement for Individual Capacity
Defendants

Plaintiff alternatively argues that even if his notice
of claim is deemed insufficient, his claims against the
individual employees for acts committed in their personal
capacity—as opposed to acts committed jr their official or
representative capacity—should not be dismissed.

In this

regard, jJaintiff argues that because section 63-30-4(4) only
addresses suits against employees in the,.] ri vy iresentative
capacity,* the Act does not apply to or preclude suits against
employees in the Si ^personal capacity."
5

Section 63-30-4(4) of

the Governmental Immunity Act provides:
An employee may be joined in an action
against a governmental entity in a
representative capacity if the act or
omission complained of is one for which the
governmental entity may be liable, but no
employee may be held personally liable toy
acts or omissions occurring durinq the
performance of the employee^ duties, within
the scope of employment or under color of
authority, unless it is established that the
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud
pr malice,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4)(1989)(emphasis added).
Also relevant to this inquiry is section 63-30-4(3) o
the Act, which provides:
The remedy against a governmental entity
or its employee for an injury caused by an
act or omission which occurs during the
performance of such employee^ duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority is, after the effective date of
this act, exclusive of any other civil action
or proceeding by reason of the same subject
matter against the ^employee. . . whose act or
omission gave rise to the claim, unless the
employee acted or failed to act through fraud
or malice.
Id. at S 63-30-4(3)(emphasis added).
Defendants1 argue that the notice of claim provisions
of the Governmental Immunity Act, Sections 63-30-11 and -12, do
not distinguish between personal and representative capacity
actions, and therefore a notice of claim is required in al1 sui
against state employees.

The notice of claim provision provide

that a written notice of claim must be filed by any person who
has •'a claim. . . against an employee for an act or omission
6

occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scpp?
fif employment, or under color of authority.*

Xfl. at f| 63-30-

11(2) # 63-30-12 (emphasis added).
The U1 th Su| re^p Count keeE!> !u a j e i with defendants'
position as reflecting the meaning of section 63-30-11 since the
1963 Amendment thereof

in Hadsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252

(Utah 1988), flu court caul that th« effect of the 1 Su 1 amendment
c c the statute was to leave only the first paragraph of 63-30-11,
". • . which requires that a notice of claim be filed with the
State in all suits brought against fctate employees for actions
taken in the course of their employment."

(Emphasis added.)

Manifestly, the actions of defendants were taken in the course of
their employment.

The Governmental Immunity Act contemplates

that ar employee can be held personally liable for acts in the
course of employment

(i.e., "acts or omissions occurring during

the performance of the employee1* duties, within the scope of
employment or under the color of authority11) if it is established
that the employee "acted or failed to act due tt ! i aurt cr
malice."

Utah Code Ann.

63-30-4(3)

It follows that the notice

of claim provision likely would be interpreted by the Utah
Supreme Court as now constituted to 1>* applicable to M l

claims

against 6tate employees, "whether or not any judgment might
ultimately be payable by the State," as long as the employees'
alleged acts "were taken U the course of their employment.11
Ha_dsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d at 252
7

I

any event, that is this

court1* "Erie guess."
Based upon the foregoing, defendants" Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is granted, and plaintiff1* pendant
state law claims (Counts IV through X) against all defendants are
dismissed.

As noted earlier, defendant David Holbrook is

dismissed entirely from plaintiff1* suit, and all claims against
defendant University of Utah are dismissed except for Count I,
the Title VII claim.
Counsel for defendants is directed to prepare a fora of
Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision and Order and
lodge the same with the court after compliance with Local Rule
13(e).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

June 5

, 1990

J THOMAS GREENE
fUTED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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